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A remarkable aspect of quantum theory is that certain measurement outcomes are entirely un-
predictable to all possible observers. Such quantum events can be harnessed to generate numbers
whose randomness is asserted based upon the underlying physical processes. We formally introduce
and experimentally demonstrate an ultrafast optical quantum randomness generator that uses a
totally untrusted photonic source. While considering completely general quantum attacks, we cer-
tify randomness at a rate of 1.1Gbps with a rigorous security parameter of 10−20. Our security
proof is entirely composable, thereby allowing the generated randomness to be utilised for arbitrary
applications in cryptography and beyond.
I. INTRODUCTION
The inherent randomness of quantum theory, embod-
ied by Born’s rule, creates fundamentally unpredictable
events. The concept of a quantum random number gen-
erator (QRNG) is to leverage this principle to produce a
random, unpredictable output with an unparalleled level
of confidence. The central challenge faced by practical
QRNGs is to rigorously quantify how much of the en-
tropy generated by a real-world device is indeed intrinsi-
cally unpredictable.
To sketch the basic idea, let’s consider a device com-
pletely described by parameters s which could be quan-
tum or classical. These are used to generate a classical
outcome X that should appear unpredictable from the
perspective of an agent external to the device. Consider
such an agent E with access to a system which includes
all the parameters s as well as any other side information
(classical or quantum). The joint system is described by
a classical-quantum state ρˆXE and the outcome’s pre-
dictability is simply the probability of the best guess
Pideal(X |E) = sup
{Eˆx}
∑
x
pxtr
(
Eˆxρˆ
x
E
)
, (1)
where the supremum is taken over all measurements {Eˆx}
made by E on the system and ρˆxE is the state of E con-
ditioned on X = x. For a real device, however, s is
never known exactly. In this case, a conservative estimate
of the predictability is given by P = maxs Pideal(X |E),
where the maximisation is taken over all plausible pa-
rameters s. Confidence in the randomness is thus linked
to claims about trusted workings of the device and subse-
quent constraints on the knowledge of the external agent.
Approaches to QRNGs differ by the detail with which
the devices need to be characterised in order to con-
strain s [1, 2]. Perhaps the simplest conceptually is a
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so-called device independent QRNG, which can take the
form of a Bell test [3–6]. In this case, the device must
be composed of two isolated measurements that employ
independently selected bases — a requirement that can
be verified with high confidence. With this condition,
P < 1 as long as the measurement outcomes violate a
Bell inequality, which in turn constrain the plausible s
[7]. In reality, however, even state-of-the-art implemen-
tations [8] are extremely complex and yield impractical
bitrates of the order ∼ 100bps. An alternate approach is
to build a QRNG in which the entire device, from quan-
tum source to measurement, is faithfully characterised
and modelled [9]. Here, the detailed characterisation,
which might use both off-line and in-line measurements,
crucially constrains s (and thus E) sufficiently to assert
a non-unit P . As such, this seemingly exhaustive type
of characterisation of the setup, and hence trust in its
proper inner workings, opens up a myriad of potential
attacks and malfunctions which might compromise the
randomness output. A series of intermediate approaches
have appeared, commonly referred to as having partial
device-independence, which yield a QRNG that permits
abstraction from part of the device while needing a de-
tailed characterisation of the remainder. These can be
broadly classified as those that are independent of the
measurement devices [10–12] or the sources [13]. A third
class, known as semi-device-independent makes no as-
sumptions on either the source or measurements except
to assert a global constraint on the relevant dimension
[14, 15], energy [16] or orthogonality of the relevant states
[17]. Finally, other works have combined assumptions,
such as the semi-source independent protocols that in-
voke a dimension assumption in conjunction with a cali-
brated detection [18–20].
Successful design of a practical QRNG must balance
confidence with ease of implementation, achievable bi-
trate, durability and cost. For example, QRNGs based
on radioactive decay have limited bitrates, whereas those
utilising electronic noise require careful distinction of
quantum and thermal fluctuations [1]. In contrast, opti-
2cal QRNGs promise well isolated quantum systems along
with speed and technical ease. Implementations have
been based on photon arrival time [21, 22], photon num-
ber statistics [23], vacuum fluctuations [24–26], phase
noise [27–29] and Raman scattering [30, 31].
In this paper, we develop a certification of quantum
randomness generated by an optical beam splitter for
which one input field is the vacuum and the other is
completely unknown. The certification was carried out
in real-time using an additional vacuum mode to tap off
part of the unknown light source prior to the random-
ness generation. This method probabilistically infers a
lower bound on the photon number of the remaining un-
trusted source impinging onto the randomness generation
measurement. We show that signals from carefully char-
acterised photodetectors, which needn’t resolve photon
number, are sufficient to both generate and certify gen-
uine quantum randomness. Our approach results in a
composably secure protocol and we provide an explicit
security proof for high-speed quantum randomness ex-
pansion. To experimentally demonstrate our scheme,
we used off-the-shelf components — a laser source, high
bandwidth photodiodes and basic linear optical elements
— and generated ≈ 1.1Gbps of quantum entropy with
composable security parameter ǫfail = 10
−20. Moreover,
we implemented hashing on this data, thereby creating
a string of random numbers that passed the NIST tests
[32]. Overall, our framework is compatible with a wide
range of optical detectors and avoids the need to trust or
precisely characterise the source of light [9, 18].
II. GENERATING RANDOMNESS FROM
UNTRUSTED LIGHT
In Eq. (1), we quantified the randomness of an out-
come X for an external agent E. As is common in quan-
tum cryptography, we will refer to this agent as Eve the
eavesdropper. An equivalent, but more convenient, way
of quantifying this randomness is to compute the quan-
tum conditional min-entropy of the quantum state ρˆXE
for the joint system XE [33]
Hmin(X |E)ρˆXE = − log2
(
sup
{Eˆx}
∑
x
pxtr
(
Eˆxρˆ
x
E
))
,(2)
where the argument of the logarithm is the guessing prob-
ability for Eve to guess X , as in Eq. (1). This quantity
has been shown to quantify the number of bits — al-
most perfectly random with respect to Eve — that can
be extracted via post-processing [34]. Notice the distinc-
tion between a quantum randomness generator (QRG)
which simply generates outputs with a certain condi-
tional min-entropy and a QRNG that also includes the
post-processing (hashing) necessary to produce almost
perfect random numbers.
A certified randomness generation protocol allows for
some, or all, devices to deviate arbitrarily from their pur-
ported specifications. A test P is applied to the experi-
mental data and only upon that test passing is the output
certified as having a certain amount of randomness ex-
cept with some small failure probability. Furthermore, a
useful generator will be robust, i.e. it will pass the test
with high probability. Formally, we can define such a
protocol as follows.
Definition 1. An (m,κ, ǫfail,m, ǫc)-certified randomness
generation protocol produces an output X of length m
such that
• Security: If the certification test P is passed, then
Hmin(X |E) ≥ κ ,
except with probability ǫfail,m.
• Completeness: There exists an honest implemen-
tation such that the test will be passed with proba-
bility 1− ǫc.
FIG. 1. Scheme for our SDI protocol. An unknown light
source ρˆE is mixed with a trusted vacuum on a beam splitter
(BS) with reflectivity r1 to perform a certification measure-
ment. The measured outcome at detector C is subject to a
test P that passes if the outcome lies within a certain range[
n−
C
, n+
C
]
. Upon passing the test, we certify a photon number
nR in mode R that impinges onto the randomness generation
measurement except with probability ǫfail.
We define our source-device-independent (SDI) pho-
tonic QRG as a protocol in which detectors and pas-
sive optical devices (e.g. beam splitters) are taken to be
trusted. Photonic states are generated via a laser as in-
put to the experiment (essentially preparing a large am-
plitude coherent state), however in the analysis, we will
not assume anything about the state of these photons and
in that sense we claim that randomness is generated in
a SDI manner. Crucially, however, we also assume that
it is possible to exploit a trusted vacuum mode. One
might point out that this is in fact assuming at least
one trusted source, namely the vacuum. Nevertheless,
we argue that vacuum is a rather privileged source in
the sense that it does not really require a “device” to
be generated, merely the ability to block an input port
3to a beam splitter. Thus, it would seem highly prefer-
able from a security perspective to trust a vacuum source
rather than some photonic state created by a sophisti-
cated device such as a laser or spontaneous parametric
down conversion (SPDC) process.
To gain some intuition, let us start by considering the
randomness generation measurement depicted in Fig. 1.
It consists of a beam splitter BS0 with reflectivity r0 =
1
2 ,
an input mode R, a trusted vacuum fed into the other in-
put mode and two output photodetectors A and B per-
forming a difference measurement. Assuming the pho-
todetectors to be perfect, we can model them as per-
forming a single measurement acting on the untrusted
photonic randomness source in mode R. The outcomes
of the measurement will be the photon numbers nA and
nB detected by detectors A and B respectively. Propa-
gating this detection event back through the beam split-
ter and using our knowledge about the trusted vacuum
mode, this measurement is then associated with positive-
operator valued measure (POVM) elements of the form
Mˆ(nA, nB)R =
(nA + nB)!
2nA+nBnA!nB !
|nA + nB〉 〈nA + nB|R ,
(3)
living in the Hilbert space of the input mode R (see Ap-
pendix A for details).
Given this, we now propose a simple certifiable ran-
domness generation protocol. It consists of recording the
value of the photon number sum N := nA + nB and
then using the difference measurement x := nA − nB as
the source of randomness. Therefore, we have two mea-
surements: one of N and one of x. The POVM Z has
elements Zˆ(N) for the measurement of N that can be
readily recovered as
Zˆ(N) =
N∑
nA=0
Mˆ(nA, N − nB)R
= |N〉 〈N |R .
(4)
On the other hand, as we show in Appendix A, the
POVM X for the value of x has elements given by
Xˆ(x) =
∞∑
nA=|x|
2−(2nA−|x|)
(
2nA − |x|
nA
)
× |2nA − |x|〉 〈2nA − |x||R . (5)
We already see the inherent randomness of this scheme
since Xˆ(x) has support over the whole Fock space.
Therefore, for any state in mode R with total photon
number N > 0, there will be multiple possible values x
which can occur. Moreover, there is a manifest indepen-
dence from the photonic input state. Because the mea-
surements described by Zˆ(N) and Xˆ(x) are by definition
compatible, we can always think of the Zˆ(N) measure-
ment happening first and projecting onto the state |N〉,
which will subsequently produce randomness when mea-
sured with X. Thus, conditioned upon observing a sum
value of N , one would certify with probability ǫfail,m = 0
an amount of randomness that scales as log2(Nπ/2) as
per Definition 1 and shown in Appendix A.
Now, consider the full setup shown in Fig. 1. We in-
troduce the certification measurement in mode C which
is done by tapping off a fraction of the completely un-
known incoming light in mode E with a beam splitter
BS1 of reflectivity r1. The input state ρˆE is mixed with
a trusted vacuum on BS1 and the reflected beam in mode
C is measured at detector C while the transmitted beam
in mode R is input to the randomness generation mea-
surement. Our test P is applied to the output of detec-
tor C with the protocol aborting if the result lies outside
a range [n−C , n
+
C ]. Upon passing the test, we obtain a
certificate that nR, the photon number in mode R, lies
within a range [n−R, n
+
R] except with some failure prob-
ability ǫfail. Then, by minimising the min-entropy over
all states within this range, we obtain a certified lower
bound on the generated randomness. For this idealised
scenario, we could allow n+R to be unbounded and would
simply look to certify the largest possible value of n−R
given a specific ǫfail.
III. CERTIFYING RANDOMNESS WITH
REALISTIC DEVICES
In a real experiment, several further complications
must be taken into account. Even in a scenario of com-
pletely trusted and calibrated devices, care must be taken
to quantify the amount of randomness that can be cred-
ibly claimed to have been generated. Firstly, real de-
tectors only possess a finite dynamic range over which
their response is meaningful. Secondly, measurement
outcomes are coarse grained to a finite resolution which
must be carefully accounted for when determining the
output randomness. Finally, noisy devices will exhibit
fluctuations due to processes not under complete experi-
mental control. Information about these processes might
be accessible to external observers and, even if not, could
certainly be stemming from physical processes that are
far from random. Nevertheless, this can be accounted
for provided the device noise is calibrated and not con-
trolled by Eve. This makes the noise essentially classical,
in the sense that we may assume that it is described by
variables λ which are distributed according to a charac-
terised probability distribution. These variables are then
given to Eve on a shot-by-shot basis.
Consequently, the first step for analysing our exper-
iment is to carefully calibrate and model the realistic
photodiodes, which output noisy voltage measurements
rather than exact photon numbers. More formally, fol-
lowing the approach of [35], we model the POVM de-
scribing our noisy, characterised measurements as a pro-
jective measurement on a larger system. For the case
of our detectors (see Fig. 5 in Appendix B for a cohe-
sive summary), the measured voltages are modelled as
follows. First, we consider an L := nmax − nmin + 1
4outcome photon number resolving measurement with a
finite range [nmin, nmax] described by measurement op-
erators that are number state projectors (i.e. Nˆ(n) =
|n〉 〈n|), except for the first and last operators which
are given by Nˆ(nmin) =
∑nmin
n=0 |n〉 〈n| and Nˆ(nmax) =∑∞
n=nmax
|n〉 〈n|. This photon number is converted to a
voltage via a conversion factor α and is then smeared by
an additional Gaussian noise term λ of known variance σ2
and finally coarse grained by an analogue to digital con-
verter (ADC) that itself has only finite range [Vmin, Vmax]
and finite resolution of 2∆ADC bins, inducing an effective
voltage resolution of δV = Vmax−Vmin
2∆ADC
. The output of such
a realistic measurement is an index, say j, correspond-
ing to a voltage bin of width δV centered at jδV . We
can therefore associate minimum and maximum voltages
v±j = δV (j ± 12 ) with this outcome j.
The certification measurement is made by mixing the
unknown photonic input ρˆE in mode E with vacuum |0〉
on a beam splitter of reflectivity r1. The reflected mode C
is then detected with a noisy photodiode (characterised
by noise standard deviation σC and voltage conversion
factor αC) that is coarse grained by an ADC. The pro-
tocol aborts for sufficiently large or small observed volt-
ages (P is now a test applied directly to the measured
voltage index). Finally, the randomness is generated by
mixing the transmitted state in mode R with another
vacuum on a beam splitter with reflectivity r0 =
1
2 and
making a coarse-grained, noisy difference measurement
characterised by noise standard deviation σD and volt-
age conversion factor αD. As with the ideal case, we can
write the measurements as operators in the input Hilbert
space. As shown in Appendix B, the POVM element for
a realistic voltage difference measurement whose outcome
is the bin labelled j is
Vˆ σD ,∆ADCD (j) =
∫
IDj
Vˆ σDD (vD) dvD , (6)
with
Vˆ σDD (vD) =
L−1∑
x=−(L−1)
e−(vD−αDx)
2/(2σ2D)√
2πσD
Xˆfin(x) , (7)
where Xˆfin(x) are the POVM elements of a difference
measurement that is identical to Eq. (5) except that it
is made with finite range photodetectors described above
and is hence only operationally equivalent over an input
photon number range [nDmin, n
D
max].
Similarly, the certification measurement element cor-
responding to the outcome bin labelled i is given by
Vˆ σC ,∆ADCC (i) =
∫
ICi
Vˆ σCC (vC) dvC , (8)
with
Vˆ σC (vC) =
nCmax∑
n=nC
min
e−(vC−αCnC)
2/(2σ2C)√
2πσC
NˆC(nC) . (9)
With this model in hand, we state our main theorem.
Theorem 1. An optical setup consisting of
• Two trusted vacuum modes
• Two beam splitters of reflectivity r0 = 12 and r1
• Two noisy photodetectors used to make a difference
measurement as described in Eq. (6)
• A third noisy photodetector used to make a certifi-
cation measurement as described in Eq. (8) which
passes the test P if i falls in a chosen range [i−, i+]
can be used as a certified (m,κ,ǫfail,m,ǫc)-randomness
generation protocol as per Definition 1 without making
any assumptions about the photonic source with
κ ≥ −m log2
(∑
x∈X
2−n
−
R
(
n−R
⌊n
−
R
+x
2 ⌋
))
, (10)
where
X ∈ N ∩
[
−
⌊
δV
2αD
⌋
,
⌊
δV
2αD
⌋]
, (11)
with δV = Vmax−Vmin
2∆ADC
,
ǫfail,m ≤ mǫfail , (12)
where
ǫfail = max{ǫ−, ǫ+}+ ǫλC , (13)
with
ǫ− = exp

−2
(
v−i−
−λ˜
αC
− r1
(
v−i−
−λ˜
αC
+ n−R − 1
))2
v−i−
−λ˜
αC
+ n−R − 1

 ,
ǫ+ = exp

−2
(
n+R − (1− r1)
(
v+i+
−λ˜
αC
+ n+R + 1
))2
v+i+
−λ˜
αC
+ n+R + 1

 ,
ǫλC = erf
(
λ˜√
2σC
)
, (14)
provided n+R is set to the saturating photon number of the
difference measurement.
Moreover,
ǫc = 1− tr


i+∑
i=i−
|α〉 〈α| Vˆ σC ,∆ADCC (i)

 , (15)
using a coherent state |α〉 as an input.
5Proof sketch: For a complete proof, see Appendix C. One
part of the proof is to show that, for any given round
of the protocol, conditioned on passing the test P , the
state in mode R has support in the photon number ba-
sis that lies almost entirely in the range [n−R, n
+
R]. More
concretely, we maximise over all possible input states to
upper bound
ǫfail := max
ρˆE
Pr
[
i− ≤ i ≤ i+ ∧ nR /∈ [n−R, n+R]
]
, (16)
the joint probability that the test would be passed in
mode C whilst a photon number outside the range
[n−R, n
+
R] was present in mode R. This quantity can be
interpreted as the probability that the conditional state
in mode R can be operationally distinguished from any
state solely supported within [n−R, n
+
R] (see Appendix D).
The second part of the proof is to optimise over all
possible input states with support only in [n−R, n
+
R] to de-
rive a lower bound on the conditional min-entropy. Note
that a priori, Eve has the freedom to choose an input
state that is potentially entangled across all m rounds,
i.e. we are considering completely general, so-called co-
herent attacks. Together, these results mean that either
the min-entropy for a single round will be lower bounded
or the protocol will abort except with probability ǫfail.
For m rounds, one can simply add these lower bounds
together to bound the min-entropy of the output string
except with a probability
ǫfail,m := 1− (1− ǫfail)m ≤ mǫfail , (17)
as claimed in Eq. (12).
Intuitively, one would expect that Eve’s optimal strat-
egy to predict the outcome of a difference measurement
would be to input a pure Fock state and this is indeed
the case. The key fact is that the realistic difference
measurement is still diagonal in the photon number ba-
sis and that a m-round protocol can be described as a
tensor product of such measurements. Note that for the
purposes of calculating the min-entropy, we consider the
difference measurement in Eq. (6) from the perspective
of Eve who knows the noise variable λD on a shot-by-
shot basis, for which Vˆ ∆ADCD (j) =
∑
x∈X Xˆ(x), where
X = {x : αDx + λD ∈ IDj }. The fact that this measure-
ment commutes with a diagonalising map in the photon
number basis makes it straightforward to show that Eve’s
optimal guessing probability is achieved by inputting a
pure Fock state. Provided we choose n+R less than nmax,
the saturation value for the detectors, then direct calcula-
tion shows that the guessing probability decreases mono-
tonically in nR. Thus, for states restricted to [n
−
R, n
+
R],
the smallest min-entropy is achieved by inputting
∣∣n−R〉.
Finally, the fact that the coefficients in Eq. (5) are those
of a binomial distribution can be used to show that Eve’s
min-entropy is minimised whenever x is minimal (0 or 1
depending if an odd or even photon number is input) and
λD = 0. Assuming that this is always the case, direct
evaluation of tr
{∣∣n−R〉 〈n−R∣∣ Vˆ ∆ADCD (n−R mod 2)} yields
the expression in Eq. (10).
Turning to the failure probability, we first define a fail-
ure operator which corresponds to taking the failure con-
dition (i.e. a passing voltage is observed at detector C
along with nR /∈ [n−R, n+R] in mode R) and write it as an
operator in the Hilbert space of Eve’s input mode
Vˆ ∆ADCF (i, n
−
R, n
+
R) =
∑
nC∈C
nR /∈[n−R ,n+R]
rnC1 (1 − r1)nR(nC + nR)!
nC !nR!
× |nC + nR〉 〈nC + nR|E . (18)
Since this operator is also diagonal in the photon num-
ber basis, one can repeat the previous arguments to show
that Eve’s optimal strategy to maximise this failure prob-
ability is also achieved by a Fock state.
The failure probability for a single round of the proto-
col can then be written as
ǫfail = max
nE
i+∑
i=i−
〈nE | Vˆ σC ,∆ADCF (i, n−R, n+R) |nE〉 , (19)
where C = {nC : αCnC + λC ∈ [i−, i+]}.
To bound this quantity, we first use our knowledge of
the certification noise variable λC . Except with prob-
ability ǫλC = erf
(
λ˜√
2σC
)
, we know that |λC | ≤ λ˜.
Substituting Eq. (18) in Eq. (19) yields two terms as
the sum over nR /∈ [n−R, n+R] decomposes as a sum for
0 ≤ nR < n−R and n+R < nR ≤ ∞. Provided we have
λC ≤ v+i+ − αC
(
n+R − n−R + 1
)
, then there is no value of
nE for which both terms will be simultaneously non-zero
and we can write
ǫfail = max{ǫ−, ǫ+}+ ǫλC , (20)
where ǫ− (ǫ+) corresponds to the lower (upper) sum.
Both of these are essentially cumulative binomial dis-
tributions. For example, for a particular value of nE
ǫ− ≤
nE∑
nC=max{n
−
C
,
nE−(n−R−1)}
rnC1 (1− r1)nR(nC + nR)!
nC !nR!
, (21)
where n−C is the smallest photon number allowed at mode
C consistent with passing the test.
For unbounded λC , it would be impossible to deter-
mine n−C or ǫ−, but again using λ˜, we can do so except
with probability ǫλC . If we define v
−(+)
i as the minimum
(maximum) voltage compatible with the passing range
[i−, i+], we can obtain a minimum (maximum) photon
number n−C = (v
−
i − λ˜)/αC (n+C = (v+i + λ˜)/αC) for mode
C compatible with passing the test. The varying lower
limit on the sum in Eq. (21) stems from the fact that for
Eve to cheat, there are two constraints on nC . First, it
must be the case that a sufficiently large number of pho-
tons go to detector C such that the test is passed, but
for sufficiently large nE this condition is superseded by
the requirement that less than n−R photons go to mode R.
6Arguments based upon the nature of the binomial coeffi-
cients allow us to show that to maximise ǫ−, Eve should
choose the input state noptE = n
−
C + n
−
R − 1. This can be
directly substituted into Eq. (21) and the application of
Hoeffding’s bound yields the term appearing in Eq. (14).
Finally, an analogous argument can be applied to bound
ǫ+ as per Eq. (14). In combination with Eq. (17) and
Eq. (20), this completes the security proof.
IV. EXPERIMENT
The experimental setup is displayed in Fig. 2 and con-
sists of a fully fibre-connected architecture with commer-
cially available components.
FIG. 2. Schematic of the fibre-connected optical setup.
VATT: (variable optical attenuator); PD: photodiode.
The light source utilised is a continuous wavelength
(CW) laser (Koheras Adjustik E15) at telecom wave-
length λ = 1550 nm. Note that the source’s linewidth
is less than 100Hz, thereby ensuring it to be effectively
single-frequency. The laser output is directed onto a fi-
bre optical isolator (Thorlabs IO-H-1550APC) in order
to prevent unwanted back reflections into the laser. A
fibre optical variable attenuator (model MAP-220CX-A
from JDSU) is used to generate different photon num-
bers impinging onto the QRG by varying the laser’s op-
tical power. The certification and randomness genera-
tion measurements are implemented using standard fibre
couplers (Thorlabs 10202A optimised for telecom wave-
length) with reflectivities r1 = 0.0965 (i.e. ≈ 90:10) and
r0 =
1
2 (i.e. 50:50) respectively. Detector C — used for
the certification measurement — is a fibre-coupled In-
GaAs PIN photodiode (Thorlabs DET08CFC/M) with
a large bandwidth BWC = 5GHz, a responsitivity of
ηC = 1.04AW
−1 at λ = 1550 nm and a transimpedance
gain of GC = 50Ω. On the other hand, the randomness
generation measurement made of detectors A and B is im-
plemented by means of a fibre-coupled balanced detector
(Thorlabs PDB-480C-AC) with the following correspond-
ing specifications: BWD = 1.6GHz, ηD = 0.95AW
−1
at λ = 1550 nm and GD = 16000Ω. Signals from the
detectors are sampled by an oscilloscope (Lecroy Wa-
veRunner 204MXi) with a 2GHz bandwidth, a sam-
pling rate of Fs = 10GS/s and a voltage resolution
of Vmax − Vmin = 10mV/div. The measurements are
recorded by an ADC as an 8-bit output, but with a cali-
brated bit depth of ∆ADC = 4.772. This corresponds to
the effective number of bits free of ADC internal noise.
A total of 24 data sets were acquired, scanning the opti-
cal power from 0mW to 6.77mW, corresponding to the
balanced detector’s linearity response range. Each mea-
surement was carried out with a time trace of T = 1ms,
yielding 10 million samples per power setting data set.
To evaluate the certified randomness of this data for a
desired failure probability ǫfail, we must first fix λ˜ such
that ǫλC < ǫfail (here we choose ǫλC = ǫfail/2). Then,
given the difference measurement’s saturation power, we
set n+R equal to the corresponding saturating photon
number nDmax = 1.06 × 107 and choose an upper volt-
age threshold vi+ in Eq. (14) such that ǫ+ < ǫfail/2. Fi-
nally, for a given lower voltage threshold vi− , we solve
Eq. (14) to find n−R such that ǫ− = ǫfail/2. This en-
sures that the photon number input to the difference
measurement lies within [n−R, n
+
R] except with probability
max{ǫ−, ǫ+} + ǫλC = ǫ− + ǫλC = ǫfail and the certified
randomness can then be determined by plugging n−R into
Eq. (10) to retrieve the conditional min-entropy.
This establishes the protocol’s SDI security as per Def-
inition 1. However, to understand how much randomness
we can expect to obtain in practice, we should also con-
sider the protocol’s completeness. Typically, we will have
some claimed specifications for the source and can choose
thresholds accordingly. We would normally only attempt
to certify a quantity and quality of randomness such that
the corresponding test P would be passed with high prob-
ability by a source satisfying the claimed specifications
using Eq. (15). Here, for simplicity, for each input power,
we will only allow ourselves to apply thresholds such that
all 107 measured samples pass the test.
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FIG. 3. Certified minimum photon number n−
R
in mode R
plotted against input optical power for various security pa-
rameters ǫfail. Voltage thresholds used in the test P are con-
strained such that all samples pass.
7In Fig. 3, the certified minimum photon number n−R
in mode R is plotted against the input optical power for
various security parameters ǫfail. The input power was
scanned across the linear range of the balanced detector,
with the voltage thresholds (v±i±) at each power setting
constrained such that all samples passed the test P . Un-
der these constraints, we chose a voltage threshold within
the range 0mV to 39.2mV. As can be seen, the certified
photon number scales linearly with the input power and
vanishes for sufficiently small or large photonic inputs.
For small powers, n−R goes to zero as no positive solution
for Eq. (14) with the required ǫ− can be found. This is
as expected given that, when a low photon number im-
pinges onto detector C, one cannot discern the produced
voltage from the detector’s inherent electronic noise. Al-
ternatively, for large powers, one can easily achieve a
small value for ǫ− but it now is not possible to obtain
a value of ǫ+ such that the total certification is valid
for ǫfail. This is also to be expected as one approaches
the balanced detector’s saturating power. Finally, for in-
creasing security (i.e. smaller ǫfail), n
−
R decreases for a
given input power and remains positive over a smaller
range of inputs. Indeed, the penultimate data point is
non-zero only for ǫfail ≥ 10−20 and no photon number
can be certified with any security for the final point.
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FIG. 4. Comparison between different min-entropy models.
The red data points are the experimentally estimated min-
entropies for different optical powers. These are obtained
from the difference measurement’s voltage histograms shown
in the inset (the voltage bins have been artificially thickened
by a factor of 10 to make the figure comprehensible). Error
bars for the data points have been included with the verti-
cal component arising from the precision of the histogram’s
gaussian fit and the horizontal error showing the electronic
noise’s contribution of detector C when measuring the optical
power. HDDmin(X) (red) and H
DD
min(X|E) (pink) are the device-
dependent (DD) min-entropy models unconditioned and con-
ditioned on Eve’s knowledge of the noise. HSDImin (X|E) (green,
orange and blue) are our SDI estimations of the conditional
min-entropy plotted against the input optical powers and for
various security parameters ǫfail.
The main result of this paper is shown in Fig. 4, for
which a comparison is made between the experimentally
estimated min-entropy, various device-dependent (DD)
min-entropy models and our SDI approach. The red
data points are experimental estimates of the uncondi-
tional min-entropy for different average input powers of
the laser. These have been calculated from histograms of
the difference measurement (shown as inset to Fig. 4) out-
put by the balanced detector. Given these histograms, a
gaussian fit was performed and the retrieved maximum
probability pmax was used to estimate the unconditional
min-entropy via Hmin = − log2(pmax). This corresponds
to a naive analysis where all observed fluctuations are
assumed to be truly random. The red line is a device-
dependent prediction for HDDmin(X), calculated using our
detector model and assuming that the laser is well mod-
elled by a coherent state |α〉. The resulting curve fits the
data well with a value R2 = 98.96%, thereby confirm-
ing the validity of our modelling. In pink, HDDmin(X |E)
corresponds to the usual device-dependent conditional
min-entropy, assuming a known source but accounting
for Eve’s knowledge of the electronic noise present in our
measurement apparatus. As such, it is equal to HDDmin(X)
but shifted down by the min-entropy associated with
the electronic noise of the balanced detector. Finally,
in green, orange and blue points, we show our SDI model
for the certified conditional min-entropy HSDImin (X |E) for
different values of the security parameter ǫfail. These
were calculated via Eq. (10) using the minimum certified
photon numbers n−R displayed in Fig. 3 for each ǫfail.
When comparing the different min-entropies in Fig. 4,
it is clear that the claimed level of randomness critically
depends on what assumptions are made about the QRG.
Indeed, if one were to naively take HDDmin(X) as a consis-
tent min-entropy model, the QRG’s output would conse-
quently be predictable since the electronic noise can be
accessible to Eve. On the other hand, whilst HDDmin(X |E)
correctly removes such classical side information, it nev-
ertheless is a device-dependent model for which the ex-
perimentalist must trust the proper working of the entire
setup, having carefully modelled it and its possible de-
viations. This means that such scheme must be secure
against all sorts of complicated attacks from Eve. In the
canonical setup of Fig. 2, a key origin of experimental
complexity arises from the input light source. Our ap-
proach provides total independence from such complexity
whilst still certifying a substantial amount of min-entropy
per measurement as well as an explicit quantification of
its confidence given by ǫfail. As can be seen in Fig. 4, we
certify up to ≈ 1.1 bit of min-entropy with ǫfail = 10−20
for the penultimate data point. While this value is about
half of what HDDmin(X |E) predicts, we argue that such
compromise is reasonable given that we can still achieve
large randomness bitrates for the added SDI security. In-
deed, the importance of our SDI protocol’s security is
starkly illustrated by the final and initial input powers
for which no min-entropy is assigned as opposed to the
device-dependent model HDDmin(X |E).
8Using a conservative random numbers’ acquisition rate
of 1GHz (i.e. a detection window of 1 ns), we obtain
a secure bit rate of 1.1Gbps with a security parameter
ǫfail = 10
−20. This achieves an ultrafast and highly se-
cure QRG based on commercially available components
and entirely independent on the incoming light source ρˆE
for which the randomness is characterised in real-time by
the certification measurement. Finally, these bits have
been converted into strings of random numbers using the
Lefthover Hash Lemma (detailed in Appendix E). A cor-
responding estimated min-entropy of 1 bits per measure-
ment was used and the obtained random numbers have
successfully passed all the NIST tests [32].
V. DISCUSSION
We now return to the desiderata previously outlined for
evaluating the usefulness of a QRG device, namely, level
of security, performance (achievable bitrate) and practi-
cality (ease of implementation, durability, and cost). Our
protocol used cheap and robust off-the-shelf components
that lend themselves to prolonged, high-speed usage and
would be amenable to miniaturisation in an integrated
photonic architecture (please consult and refer to our
patent [36] if you wish to undertake this route). Whilst
real-time post-processing was not implemented in this
work, it has already been shown that field-programmable
gate array (FPGA) technology is already sufficiently ad-
vanced to carry out the necessary hashing at speeds in
the Gbps range [26, 37] and would therefore not lead to
a reduction in the final rate of random numbers.
In terms of security and performance, our work con-
siders completely general quantum attacks and achieves
significantly higher bitrates for a given security param-
eter than the fastest known source- (5Kbps in [13]),
measurement- (5.7Kbps in [12]), semi- (16.5Mbps in
[17]) or fully device-independent protocols (180bps in
[6]). Note that, given our experimental architecture,
other works achieving similar rates than ours are exis-
tent but only at the price of restricting the generality of
the security proofs.
The experimental architectures most similar to ours
are a recent series of papers that involve homodyning the
vacuum [19], or squeezed state [38], or dual-homodyning
the vacuum [39] and were claimed to be SDI. Indeed,
these works also achieve impressive rates as high as
17Gbps. To derive a SDI proof, these works apply en-
tropic uncertainty relations that can, in principle, lead
to devices for which randomness can be certified even
if the source of quantum states is completely unknown,
provided the measurements acting on these states are
well-characterised. However, for realistic homodyne de-
tectors with finite range, the corresponding uncertainty
relation becomes trivial and no randomness can be cer-
tified [40]. This problem can be ameliorated but only at
the price of introducing an energy assumption (similar to
the semi-device-independent approach) upon the source,
thus jeopardising the claimed SDI.
Another consideration when developing a protocol for
certified randomness is whether such a protocol is com-
posably secure [33, 41]. That is, whether the output of
the protocol can then be used as an input to other cryp-
tographic protocols without compromising the security.
For example, it can be input to a randomness extrac-
tor along with a seed to achieve certified randomness ex-
pansion using well known techniques [35, 42]. It is still
unknown whether fully device-independent protocols are
composably secure without extra assumptions, e.g. de-
vices are memoryless [43]. It is thus necessary to move
beyond device independence if one desires a composably
secure protocol.
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, we presented and experimentally imple-
mented a SDI protocol based on the quantum nature
of untrusted light. Our scheme achieves state-of-the-
art ultrafast randomness bitrates whilst providing a rig-
orous and specific security parameter for the certified
conditional min-entropy totally independent of the light
source. There are several avenues to further improve the
performance of our scheme. A higher bandwidth bal-
anced detector for the randomness generation speed as
well as a larger bit-resolution of the ADC for the re-
trievable min-entropy per sample are primary examples
among them.
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9Appendix A: Certifiable randomness of ideal difference measurement
To begin with, consider the randomness generation measurement of Fig. 1. It consists of a beam splitter BS0 with
reflectivity r0 =
1
2 , an input mode R, a trusted vacuum fed into the other input mode and two output photodetectors
A and B performing a difference measurement. It simplifies matters greatly if we can prove that the potential
eavesdropper in charge of our photonic source is making definite photon number states (i.e. Fock states) for each
round of the protocol. In particular, we would like to rule out any sophisticated, collective strategy where Eve sends
a complicated state that is entangled across all rounds of the protocol.
Intuitively, this should be the case because the randomness generation measurement for each round is a photon
number difference and can be thought of as a coarse graining over an initial measurement that is diagonal in the Fock
basis. Here, this is shown by writing out the POVM directly and the optimality of unentangled Fock state inputs
from Eve’s perspective becomes explicit.
For a single round, the entire process of mixing ρˆR with a vacuum ancilla |0〉 ∈ HV and then making Fock state
projections upon both output ports can be seen as a POVM on HR, the Hilbert space of ρˆR. Consider the probability
for detecting nA and nB photons at detectors A and B. This is given by
p(nA, nB) = tr
{
UˆBS0(ρˆR ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)Uˆ †BS0(|nA〉 |nB〉 〈nA| 〈nB|)
}
= trR
{
trV
{
(ρˆR ⊗ |0〉 〈0|)Uˆ †BS0(|nA〉 |nB〉 〈nA| 〈nB|)UˆBS0
}}
= trR
{
ρˆRMˆ(nA, nB)
}
, (A1)
where
Mˆ(nA, nB) = 〈0| Uˆ †BS0 |nA〉 |nB〉 〈nA| 〈nB| UˆBS0 |0〉 , (A2)
is the corresponding POVM element in the input state Hilbert space (with the subscript R suppressed for brevity).
This expression is just the evolution of the Fock state projections back through the beam splitter BS0 and projected
onto the vacuum ancilla. To get an explicit expression, it is simpler to switch to the Heisenberg picture for the reverse
beam splitter transformation
|nA〉 |nB〉 = (aˆ
†
A)
nA
√
nA!
(aˆ†B)
nB
√
nB!
|0〉
U†BS07→
(
(aˆ†E+aˆ
†
V√
2
)nA
√
nA!
(
(aˆ†E−aˆ†V√
2
)nB
√
nB!
|0〉
=
∑nA
k=0
∑nB
j=0(aˆ
†
E)
nA−k(aˆ†V )
k
(
nA
k
)
(−1)j(aˆ†E)nB−j(aˆ†V )j
(
nB
j
)
2(nA+nB)/2
√
nA!nB !
|0〉
=
∑nA
k=0
∑nB
j=0
√
(nA + nB − j − k)!(j + k)!
(
nA
k
)
(−1)j(nBj )
2(nA+nB)/2
√
nA!nB!
|nA + nB − j − k〉R |j + k〉V . (A3)
Acting on left with 〈0| on the ancilla mode implies that we must have j + k = j = k = 0, thus
〈0| Uˆ †BS0 |nA〉 |nB〉 =
√
(nA + nB)!
2(nA+nB)/2
√
nA!nB!
|nA + nB〉R , (A4)
and hence
Mˆ(nA, nB) =
(nA + nB)!
2(nA+nB)nA!nB!
|nA + nB〉 〈nA + nB|R
= 2−N
N !
nA!(N − nA)! |N〉 〈N |R , (A5)
where we have substituted in the total photon numberN := nA+nB. As expected, each POVM element is proportional
to a single Fock state of fixed photon number N and the coefficient can be understood intuitively. Indeed, each of the
N photons can be thought of as individually randomising at the beam splitter. The probability for a specific sequence
of paths taken by each photon is 2−N and thus the probability of observing the POVM element Mˆ(nA, nB) is the
number of paths such that nA out of N photons could have been recorded at detector A, which is
(
N
nA
)
as above.
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If we consider the sum measurement, it is just a coarse graining over the two outcome POVM, summing together
all the elements such that nA + nB = N . The POVM elements of the sum measurement Z = {Zˆ(N)} are
Zˆ(N) =
N∑
nA=0
Mˆ(nA, N − nA) . (A6)
Using the fact that
∑n
k=0
(
n
k
)
= 2n, we can see that Zˆ(N) = |N〉 〈N |R and it is thus just a photon number projector
as expected.
The randomness generation measurement is another coarse graining. However, it will turn out to have larger rank
and consequently some randomness for all possible input states other than the vacuum. Define X = {Xˆ(x)} as the
POVM elements of the randomness generation measurement corresponding to the cases where nA − nB := x. These
are given by
Xˆ(x) =
∞∑
nA=x
Mˆ(nA, nA − x)
=
∞∑
nA=x
2−(2nA−x)
(
2nA − x
nA
)
|2nA − x〉 〈2nA − x|R , (A7)
if x is positive and
Xˆ(x) =
∞∑
nA=|x|
Mˆ(nA − |x|, nA)
=
∞∑
nA=|x|
2−(2nA−|x|)
(
2nA − |x|
nA
)
|2nA − |x|〉 〈2nA − |x||R , (A8)
if x is negative or
Xˆ(x) =
∞∑
nA=|x|
2−(2nA−|x|)
(
2nA − |x|
nA
)
|2nA − |x|〉 〈2nA − |x||R , (A9)
for all x.
Note that for x even (odd), then Xˆ(x) only has support over even (odd) number states. Clearly, if Eve inputs
a vacuum state, then the difference outcome can be predicted with certainty as x = 0. However, as pointed out
in the main text, if one observes a value N for her sum measurement, then regardless of the original input, she
performs a projection onto the state |N〉 and can immediately calculate the guessing probability of the X measurement
pguess = maxx 〈N | Xˆ(x) |N〉 from Eq. (A9) and hence the associated min-entropy. For perfect measurements, this
would guarantee the min-entropy with certainty and in a SDI manner.
Now, consider the full setup shown in Fig. 1. We introduce the certification measurement in mode C which is done
by tapping off a fraction of the completely unknown incoming light in mode E with a beam splitter BS1 of reflectivity
r1. The input state ρˆE is mixed with vacuum on BS1 and the reflected beam in mode C is measured at detector
C while the transmitted beam in mode R is input to the randomness generation measurement. For simplicity, we
will imagine that the outcome at detector C is also always given to Eve. Writing the photon number projections as
operators on the input Hilbert space HE is the same calculation as Eq. (A5), except now with a beam splitter of
reflectivity r1 instead of
1
2 . This gives
Mˆ(nC , nR) =
rnC1 (1− r1)nR(nC + nR)!
nC !nR!
|nC + nR〉 〈nC + nR|E , (A10)
and hence the certification measurement has elements
NˆC(nC) =
∞∑
nR=0
rnC1 (1− r1)nR(nC + nR)!
nC !nR!
|nC + nR〉 〈nC + nR|E . (A11)
Given this measurement, one cannot exactly determine the number of photons in mode R incident onto the ran-
domising beam splitter BS0, but one can obtain a lower bound on the min-entropy of m such measurements except
with some failure probability ǫfail,m. Specifically, we impose a test P at detector C which is passed if the measured
photon number is greater than a lower threshold n−C . Upon passing the test P , we certify a lower bound n−R on the
photon number in mode R impinging onto the randomness generation measurement. We formally state and prove
this result below.
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Theorem 2. An optical setup consisting of
• Two trusted vacuum modes
• Two beam splitters of reflectivity r0 = 12 and r1
• Three ideal photon counting detectors A, B and C
utilised to perform a certification measurement modelled by Eq. (A11) with lower threshold n−C and a randomness
generation measurement modelled by Eq. (A9) can be used as a certified (m,κ,ǫfail,m,ǫc)-randomness generation protocol
as per Definition 1 without making any assumptions about the photonic source with
κ ≥ −m log2

2−n−R( n−R⌊n−
R
2
⌋)


≥ m
(
log2
(
1
2
πn−R
)
−O
(
1
n−R
))
, (A12)
ǫfail,m ≤ m exp
(
−2(r1(n
−
R + n
−
C − 1)− n−C)2
n−R + n
−
C − 1
)
, (A13)
and
ǫc = 1− e−|α|
2
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
nC=n
−
C
|α|2n
n!
rnC1 (1 − r1)n−nCn!
nC !(n− nC)! , (A14)
using a coherent state |α〉 as an input.
Proof. Security: The key feature here is the diagonal nature in the photon number basis of all measurements
performed in the protocol. We first prove a Lemma regarding such measurements.
Lemma 1. For a m-round, SDI protocol involving a measurement Q in each round that is diagonal in the number
basis with elements
Qˆ(q) =
∑
n
cn(q) |n〉 〈n| ,
∑
q
Qˆ(q) = I , (A15)
Eve’s optimal strategy to maximise the probability of a desired outcome q∗ is to input a pure Fock state |n∗〉 for
each round. Moreover, this remains true for inputs with restricted support in the Fock basis.
Proof. One way to see this is to consider a diagonalising map in the Fock basis applied to the input of the ith round
Dˆi(ρˆ) =
∑
n
〈n| ρˆ |n〉 |n〉 〈n| . (A16)
This operator commutes with the Q measurement and there is no operational way for Eve (or anyone else) to
distinguish between directly measuring Q or measuring Q after first applying Dˆ. As such, we could imagine that
we are in fact always applying Dˆ to each run of the protocol [44]. To start with, since Dˆ satisfies the definition
of an entanglement breaking map [45], we may safely conclude that Eve’s optimal strategy will not include any
entanglement as there is no way for such entanglement to be noticeable. Moreover, if we consider any individual
round of the protocol, we can write its purification as a mode E′ held by Eve (including potentially all the other
rounds of the protocol) in the Schmidt form |ΨE′E〉 =
∑
j λj |j〉E′ |j〉E (with |j〉 not necessarily the Fock basis) and
act Dˆ upon it. This yields
(I⊗ Dˆ) |ΨE′E〉 〈ΨE′E | =
∑
j,k
λjλ
∗
k |j〉 〈k| Dˆ(|j〉 〈k|)
=
∑
n
σˆE′n ⊗ |n〉 〈n| , (A17)
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where σˆE′n =
∑
j,l,n λlλ
∗
j 〈n|l〉 〈j|n〉 |l〉 〈j|. This means that the most general state Eve can effectively prepare for the
input mode E is of the form
ρˆE =
∑
n
p(n) |n〉 〈n| , (A18)
where p(n) =
∑
j |λj 〈n|j〉 |2. In other words, the input state for each run of the protocol is effectively just a mixture of
Fock states (potentially classically correlated between rounds). Intuitively, one would imagine that the best strategy
for Eve would be to choose a state such that {|j〉} is indeed the Fock basis and, moreover, to make p(n) simply a
delta function at some fixed n.
We can show this as follows. Let p∗(n) be the distribution of the optimal input state that maximises the probability
of q∗ and {cn(q∗)} be the Fock state coefficients for that element as given in Eq. (A15). Then, Eve’s optimal probability
is given by
popt = tr{ρˆE′E(I⊗ Qˆ(q∗))}
=
∑
n
p∗(n)cn ≤ max
n
cn ×
∑
n
p∗(n) = cn∗ , (A19)
where we have defined n∗ as the value that achieves the maximum. This optimal guessing probability would be
saturated by choosing an input state |n∗〉, therefore the optimal input state is indeed a pure Fock state.
Note that the result extends straightforwardly to the case where the input state is restricted to have support only
over a finite range of number states [n−R, n
+
R]. Let p
∗(n) be a probability distribution over [n−R, n
+
R], x
∗ be the value
of the most likely POVM element of the difference measurement given that input state and cn be the Fock state
coefficients for that element as given in Eq. (A9). Then
pguess = tr{ρˆE′E(I⊗ Xˆ(x∗))}
=
n+R∑
n−R
p∗(n)cn ≤ max
n∈[n−
R
,n+
R
]
cn ×
∑
n
p∗(n) = cn∗ . (A20)
Therefore, the optimal input state is |n〉 with n ∈ [n−R, n+R]. This result can be independently applied to each
run of the protocol (by including the other rounds in the purification, Eve has already been granted the option to
utilise a sophisticated collective encoding), hence we can conclude that Eve’s optimal probability to obtain a string
of outcomes for all m rounds is to choose a single Fock state for each round.
Given Lemma 1, we now lower bound the min-entropy under the assumption that Eve’s input state only has support
over number states in the range [n−R,∞[. Eve’s guess for the difference measurement outcome will always be just the
outcome of the most likely element of the difference element defined in Eq. (A9). Thus, if we choose x∗ to be the
most probable outcome of the difference measurement (whatever that might be), then we can immediately conclude
that for input states restricted to have support only over the range [n−R,∞[, Eve’s optimal strategy to maximise the
occurrence of x∗ (and hence her guessing probability) will be to input a number state |n〉 ∈ [n−R,∞[. In fact, it will
be optimal to input the smallest number state
∣∣n−R〉. We have
pguess = max
n
〈n| Xˆ(x∗) |n〉
≤ max
n∈[n−
R
,∞[
2−n
(
n⌊
n+|x∗|
2
⌋)
= max
n∈[n−R,∞[
2−n
(
n⌊
n
2
⌋)
= 2−n
−
R
(
n−R⌊
n−R
2
⌋) , (A21)
where in the penultimate line, we used the fact that
(
n
k
)
is maximal for k =
⌊
n
2
⌋
and monotonically decreases for
greater and smaller values of k, which means that the smallest allowed x will be optimal. In the final line, we used
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that
(
n
⌊n+x2 ⌋
)
decreases monotonically in n. To see this, first note that for n even
⌊
n+1
2
⌋
=
⌊
n
2
⌋
and for n odd⌊
n+1
2
⌋
=
⌊
n
2
⌋
+ 1. Thus the ratio of successive terms is
2−(n+1)
( n+1
⌊n+12 ⌋
)
2−n
(
n
⌊n2 ⌋
) = 1
2
(n+ 1)
⌊
n
2
⌋
!⌊
n+1
2
⌋
!
(
n− ⌊n2 ⌋)!(
n+ 1− ⌊n+12 ⌋)!
=


1
2 (n+ 1)
(n−n2 )!
(n+1−n2 )!
= 12
(n+1)
n+1−n
2
= n+1n+2 < 1 , n even
1
2 (n+ 1)
⌊n
2
⌋!
(⌊n
2
⌋+1)! =
1
2
n+1
⌊n
2
⌋+1 = 1 , n odd
. (A22)
Substituting this optimal guessing probability into the definition of the conditional min-entropy gives the expression
in Eq. (A12).
Now, we show that provided that in each round the certification measurement outcome is above a certain threshold
n−C , the input to the QRG is ǫfail,m-indistinguishable from a state with support only over [n
−
R,∞[. The worst case
scenario would be that whenever Eve can distinguish the real state from one with restricted support, she learns the full
measurement record. We can thus interpret this distinguishing probability as a lower bound to the failure probability
for the whole protocol.
Specifically, we are interested in the probability where the certification measurement takes a value which passes our
test P whilst simultaneously a smaller than desired number of photons goes to the randomness generation measure-
ment, thereby representing a failure of the protocol. As such, we introduce a failure operator corresponding to Eve
successfully cheating in this way, expressed as
Fˆ (nC , n
−
R) =
n−
R∑
nR=0
rnC1 (1− r1)nR(nC + nR)!
nC !nR!
|nC + nR〉 〈nC + nR|E , (A23)
with the failure probability for a single round given by
ǫfail = max
ρˆE
tr

ρˆE
∞∑
nC=n
−
C
Fˆ (nC , n
−
R)

 . (A24)
It is straightforward to see (and we show it in Appendix D) that this probability is also explicitly the distinguishing
probability between the real input state ρˆE and the closest state with support solely in the range [n
−
R,∞[ as one would
expect in a composably secure framework. Since Fˆ is once more diagonal in the photon number basis, we can again
apply Lemma 1 to conclude that Eve’s optimal strategy is achieved by a single number state |nE〉. Substitution via
Eq. (A23) gives
ǫfail ≤ max
nE
nE∑
nC=max{n−C ,
nE−(n−R−1)}
rnC1 (1− r1)nE−nCnE!
nC !(nE − nC)! . (A25)
The lower limit on nC in the sum comes from the fact that for nE > n
−
C + n
−
R − 1, the requirement for at least n−C
photons at detector C is superseded by the requirement that there be less than n−R photons in mode R which implies
nC > nE − n−R. In fact, we show that Eve’s optimal input is to send precisely noptE = n−C + n−R − 1 photons. The
summand is a generic binomial distribution
B(r1, nE, k) = r
k
1 (1− r1)nE−knE !
k!(nE − k)! , (A26)
such that the failure probability in Eq. (A25) can be seen as the complement of the binomial cumulative distribution
function (CDF). For a fixed lower limit in the sum, this quantity increases monotonically with nE . However, once
nE > n
−
C + n
−
R − 1, the situation is more complicated because the limits of the sum change as well as the summand.
Instead of running from n−C to nE , it will run from n
−
C+1 to nE+1. We now show that the difference between successive
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terms of the sum for all values nE larger than this threshold is negative and thus the function is monotonically
decreasing in nE . Hence, it reaches its maximum for nE = n
−
C + n
−
R − 1. For all nE ≥ n−C + n−R − 1, we have
ǫfail(nE + 1)− ǫfail(nE) ≤
nE+1∑
nC=n
−
C
+1
rnC1 (1− r1)nE+1−nC
(
nE + 1
nC
)
−
nE∑
nC=n
−
C
rnC1 (1− r1)nE−nC
(
nE
nC
)
=
nE∑
nC=n
−
C
+1
rnC1 (1− r1)nE−nC
(
(1− r1)
(
nE + 1
nC
)
−
(
nE
nC
))
+ rnE+11 − rn
−
C
1 (1− r1)nE−n
−
C
(
nE
n−C
)
=
nE∑
nC=n
−
C+1
rnC1 (1− r1)nE−nC
(
−r1 + nC
nE − nC + 1(1− r1)
)(
nE
nC
)
+ rnE+11 − rn
−
C
1 (1− r1)nE−n
−
C
(
nE
n−C
)
, (A27)
where we used Pascal’s identity
(
n− 1
k
)
+
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
=
(
n
k
)
and
(
n
k − 1
)
=
k
n+ 1− k
(
n
k
)
in the last line.
Using the following result
nE∑
nC=n
−
C
(
nE
nC
)
=
(
nE
n−C
)
2F1(1, n
−
C − nE ;n−C + 1;−1) , (A28)
where 2F1 is the hypergeometric function, it can be shown after some algebra that Eq. (A27) simply reduces to
ǫfail(nE + 1)− ǫfail(nE) ≤ −(1− r1)nE−n
−
C
+1r
n−
C
1
(
nE
n−C
)
, (A29)
which is always negative. Thus, the optimal value for Eve to maximise the failure probability is the single Fock state
with photon number noptE = n
−
C + n
−
R − 1. Substitution into Eq. (A25) then gives
ǫfail ≤
nopt
E∑
nC=n
−
C
rnC1 (1 − r1)n
opt
E −nC
(
noptE
nC
)
≤ exp
(
−2(n
−
C − r1noptE )2
noptE
)
, (A30)
where the last line is given by Hoeffding’s inequality which states that for a binomial distribution B(r1, nE , k) with
n−C ≥ nEr1, one gets
nE∑
k=n−
C
B(r1, nE , k) ≤ exp
(
−2(n
−
C − r1nE)2
nE
)
. (A31)
Finally, the probability that any one of the m rounds fails is the complement that all of them pass thus
ǫfail,m = 1− (1 − ǫfail)m ≤ 1− (1−mǫfail) = mǫfail , (A32)
which is precisely the result stated Eq. (A13), thereby completing the proof.
Completeness: Substituting in the number state expansion for a coherent state |α〉 and calculating the probability
for the certification test to pass via Eq. (A23) gives the desired result expressed in Eq. (A14).
Appendix B: Modelling Detectors
Here, we remove the idealised assumptions from the previous section and present a detailed detector model.
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1. Finite range of photodetectors
As a first idealisation, we shall remove the assumption of infinite dynamic range for the photodiodes. In fact, the
detectors only respond linearly above and below certain photon numbers thresholds, namely nmin and nmax. In reality,
as the detectors enter this nonlinear regime, there will still be quantum randomness in their outcome statistics, but
we take the worst case view and assume that all states with overly large or small photon numbers will be mapped
with certainty to “end bins”, thereby yielding no such randomness. Thus, instead of a sum over all photon number
states, we model a photodetection with L := nmax − nmin + 1 measurement operators given by
Nˆ(nmin) =
nmin∑
n=0
|n〉 〈n| ,
Nˆ(n) = |n〉 〈n| , ∀ nmin < n < nmax ,
Nˆ(nmax) =
∞∑
n=nmax
|n〉 〈n| . (B1)
This can make quite a difference to the output randomness since if Eve either inputs a sufficiently small or large
number of photons, she can be sure that the lower or upper outcome will occur on detectors A and B, leading to a
difference outcome of 0 with certainty. This can be seen directly by calculating the difference measurement POVM
elements using finite range photodetectors as an operator in Eve’s input Hilbert space as before to find
Xˆfin(x) =
nmax∑
nA=|x|
Mˆ(nA, nA − |x|) , (B2)
where
Mˆ(nA, nB) = 〈0| Uˆ †BS0Nˆ(nA)⊗ Nˆ(nB)UˆBS0 |0〉 . (B3)
For states with an appropriate photon number support, a difference measurement made using finite range photode-
tectors will be virtually indistinguishable from the ideal difference measurement in Eq. (A9). Specifically, if a number
state |n〉 is input to a difference measurement with two detectors A and B that have linearity ranges [nmin, nmax]
such that nmin << n/2 << nmax, then the probability that either detector will register a number of photons outside
its linear range will be given by the tails of a binomial distribution. It can then be checked whether this probability
is smaller than the other failure probabilities in the protocol (typical realistic values will render it far smaller, i.e.
∝ 1 × 10−30000). Alternatively, one can also directly empirically verify the linear response range [nDmin, nDmax] of a
difference measurement by inputting a known photonic laser source and observing that the difference variance indeed
grows linearly when the laser’s optical power is increased.
This finite range of the photodetection also applies to the certification measurement in mode C using a finite range
detector with linear range [nCmin, n
C
max] and LC = n
C
max − nCmin + 1 possible outcomes. We have
NˆC,fin(nC) =
nCmax∑
nC=nCmin
NˆC(nC) . (B4)
Finally, we can also write the failure operator associated with this certification measurement. It will be similar to
the ideal case in Eq. (A23) except for the end bins. The failure of the protocol occurs when the test is passed and
there are either too many (more than n+R) or too few (less than n
−
R) photons incident onto the difference measurement.
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We obtain the following failure operator
Fˆ (nCmin, n
−
R, n
+
R) =
nCmin∑
nC=0

 n
−
R∑
nR=0
rnC1 (1− r1)nR(nC + nR)!
nC !nR!
|nC + nR〉 〈nC + nR|E
+
∞∑
nR=n
+
R
+1
rnC1 (1− r1)nR(nC + nR)!
nC !nR!
|nC + nR〉 〈nC + nR|E

 ,
Fˆ (nCmax, n
−
R, n
+
R) =
∞∑
nC=nCmax+1

 n
−
R∑
nR=0
rnC1 (1− r1)nR(nC + nR)!
nC !nR!
|nC + nR〉 〈nC + nR|E
+
∞∑
nR=n
+
R
+1
rnC1 (1− r1)nR(nC + nR)!
nC !nR!
|nC + nR〉 〈nC + nR|E

 ,
Fˆ (nC , n
−
R, n
+
R) =
n−
R∑
nR=0
rnC1 (1− r1)nR(nC + nR)!
nC !nR!
|nC + nR〉 〈nC + nR|E
+
∞∑
nR=n
+
R
+1
rnC1 (1− r1)nR(nC + nR)!
nC !nR!
|nC + nR〉 〈nC + nR|E ,
∀ nCmin < nC < nCmax . (B5)
2. Voltage response and temporal behaviour
The next step in our modelling is to take into account the fact that the detector response is not completely flat
over the time window that makes up one round of the protocol. Instead, the voltage response decays exponentially in
time. However, using careful spectral filtering, one can enforce an effectively flat temporal distribution for incoming
photons. Considering this, we show that we can model the voltage response with a single average conversion factor α.
In general, the detector response of a photodiode can be regarded as analogous to a RC circuit where the voltage
at time T is given by
V (T ) =
1
C
∫ ∞
0
e−τ/RCI(T − τ) dτ , (B6)
where I(T − τ) is the current generated by the absorbed photons. However, one cannot take the above equation
too literally since a genuinely continuous time dependence would correspond to a detector with infinite temporal
resolution. Instead, we model a voltage detector as having K finite time intervals δt = T/K over which the response is
flat (i.e. the detector cannot resolve temporal differences smaller than δt). The entire detection of the window T can
then be regarded as post-processing of the K-outcome POVM made up of each detection intervals δt. This POVM
has elements of the form
Mˆ(n) = Nˆ(n1)⊗ Nˆ(n2)...⊗ Nˆ(nK) , (B7)
where n = [n1, n2, ...nK ]. The voltage response to a photon arriving at the k
th interval is given by a conversion factor
αk := βe
−(K−k)BWδt , (B8)
where β is a constant. The voltage POVM is thus expressed as
Vˆ (v) =
∑
n
cn,k(v)Mˆ (n) , (B9)
with
cn,k(v) = δ(v − nαT ) , (B10)
where αT = [α1, .., αk]
T and the sum is over all LK possible values for n.
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In principle, this temporal detector response could open loopholes for Eve to exploit. For example, if she were able
to generate extremely short time pulses, Eve could saturate individual detectors which would then be heavily damped
in time (due to the exponential term in Eq. (B8)), resulting in a certification voltage that would appear acceptable
even though there would be no randomness in this case. However, these temporal attacks can be circumvented via
an appropriate choice of spectral filtering in the detection process. For transform-limited pulses, a sufficiently narrow
spectral filter enforces an effectively flat temporal distribution for the detected photons. Since the source in our
experiment is extremely narrowband (single frequency CW laser), we can afford to use a correspondingly narrow filter
without altering the detection rates in our actual implementation. Note that a pulsed system which cannot afford to
be similarly filtered without reducing the resulting count rates would require a careful analysis of the effects of Eve’s
temporal modulation of the source on the output statistics. This highlights the importance of considering all relevant
physical degrees of freedom in certified randomness generation.
Considering our implementation, the voltage response of a detector to a photon arrival is given by a time averaged
conversion factor
α :=
hcBWηG
λ
, (B11)
where h is Planck’s constant, c is the speed of light, BW is the detector’s bandwidth, η is its responsitivity (in AW−1)
at the wavelength λ considered and G is the transimpedence gain.
3. Electronic Noise
So far, all measurements have been described without the presence of detector noise. As outlined in the main
text, our detector’s noise λ is well modelled as being Gaussian with variance σ2. We want to write down the POVM
describing a voltage measurement over an appropriate basis as parameterised by its outcome. Given that the noisy
measurement is still phase insensitive, the POVM elements can be written diagonally in the Fock basis as
Vˆ σ(v) =
nmax∑
n=nmin
e−(v−αn)
2/(2σ2)
√
2πσ
Nˆ(n) . (B12)
Consider the randomness generation measurement. Since the detector noise terms are taken to be independent from
one another, we can equivalently combine them into a single overall noise variable λD with variance σ
2
D = σ
2
A + σ
2
B
(this joint variable is what was determined in practice during device calibration) that acts to smear out the ideal
difference measurement to obtain [46]
Vˆ σDD (vD) =
L−1∑
x=−(L−1)
e−(vD−αDx)
2/(2σ2D)√
2πσD
Xˆfin(x) , (B13)
with Xˆfin(x) given by Eq. (B2) but effectively by Eq. (A9) for the photon ranges we will certify.
In addition, the certification measurement’s POVM accounting for the Gaussian noise characterised by variance σ2C
is given by
Vˆ σCC (vC) =
nCmax∑
n=nC
min
e−(vC−αCnC)
2/(2σ2C)√
2πσC
NˆC,fin(nC) . (B14)
Finally, for the failure operator associated with the certification measurement with Gaussian electronic noise, we
have the following
Vˆ σCF (vC , n
−
R, n
+
R) =
nCmax∑
nC=nCmin
e−(vC−αCnC)
2/(2σ2C)√
2πσC
Fˆ (nC , n
−
R, n
+
R) , (B15)
where αC is the voltage conversion factor for the photodetector C and σC is the standard deviation of its associated
electronic noise.
For the security analysis later, we will often be interested in the measurement operators from Eve’s perspective
who always knows the relevant value of λ. This leads to a voltage POVM given by
Vˆ (v) = Nˆ
(
v − λ
α
)
, (B16)
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a difference measurement
VˆD(vD) = Xˆfin
(
vD − λD
αD
)
, (B17)
a certification measurement
VˆC(vC) = NˆC,fin
(
nC − λC
αC
)
, (B18)
and a failure operator associated with certification voltage measurement
VˆF (vC , n
−
R, n
+
R) = Fˆ
(
vC − λC
αC
, n−R, n
+
R
)
. (B19)
4. Finite resolution and range of oscilloscope and analogue-to-digital converter
In the previous section, we modelled the detectors as having a finite range but otherwise being perfectly photon-
number resolving and convolved with a classical noise variable subsequently given to the eavesdropper. In fact, the
randomness generation measurement has a finite resolution which corresponds to an extra coarse graining. Specifically,
the analogue-to-digital converter (ADC) which processes the voltage signal can only record a certain set range of
voltages [Vmin, Vmax], with all voltages greater or smaller than this amount registered as results in the “end bin”.
Furthermore, within the range [Vmin, Vmax], voltages are only recorded with a finite resolution. Therefore, whilst an
ideal voltage measurement might have unbounded and continuous values, a real detector in combination with an ADC
with finite bits of resolution ∆ADC outputs J = 2
∆ADC outcomes with corresponding POVM elements {Vˆ σ,∆ADC(j)}j
for the measured jth bin expressed as
Vˆ σ,∆ADC(j) =
∫
Ij
Vˆ σ(v) dv , (B20)
where the integration regions are given by
I−(J−1)/2 = [−∞, Vmin + δV [, I−(J−1)/2+1 = [Vmin + δV, Vmin + 2δV [, . . .
. . . , I0 = [−δV, δV [, . . . , I(J−1)/2 = [Vmin + (J − 1)δV,∞[ , (B21)
and δV = Vmax−Vmin
2∆ADC
is the effective voltage resolution induced by ∆ADC.
As a result, the coarse grained noisy difference measurement operators are given by {Vˆ σD ,∆ADCD (j)}j for which
Vˆ σD ,∆ADCD (j) =
∫
IDj
Vˆ σDD (vD) dvD . (B22)
The corresponding difference measurement from Eve’s perspective (i.e. given the relevant λ) would be
Vˆ ∆ADCD (j) =
∫
IDj −λD
VˆD(vD) dvD
=
∑
x∈X
Xˆfin(x) , (B23)
where
x ∈ X = {x : αDx+ λD ∈ IDj } . (B24)
The certification voltage measurement is recorded by an ADC with the same resolution and consequently it is still a
J-outcome measurement but over an ADC range [V Cmin, V
C
max] and a corresponding voltage resolution δVC =
V Cmax−V Cmin
2∆ADC
.
This leads to intervals ICi which are defined as per Eq. (B21) and coarse-grained certification measurements elements
Vˆ σC ,∆ADCC (i) =
∫
ICi
Vˆ σCC (vC) dvC . (B25)
Moreover, the associated failure operator is
Vˆ σC ,∆ADCF (i, n
−
R, n
+
R) =
∫
ICi
Vˆ σCF (vC , n
−
R, n
+
R) dvC . (B26)
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For a fixed value of the noise variable λC , we have the following failure operator from Eve’s perspective
Vˆ ∆ADCF (i, n
−
R, n
+
R) =
∫
ICi −λC
VˆF (vC , n
−
R, n
+
R) dvC
=
∑
nC∈C
Fˆ (nC , n
−
R, n
+
R) , (B27)
where
C = {nC : αCnC + λC ∈ ICi } . (B28)
In general, one must be mindful of the interplay between the conversion from photon number to voltage and the
final voltage resolution. Indeed, if the signal were to experience strong attenuation (very small α), then the voltage
distribution would start to become small with respect to the fixed voltage resolution and the entropy would decrease.
In our implementation, we carefully kept track of the coarse graining, thus avoiding such issue.
Before we proceed further, we show in Fig. 5 a schematic drawing summarising our detector’s model. The POVMs
present in the figure are those specified in this appendix.
FIG. 5. Detector model. Photons from a photonic state ρˆ impinge onto a photodiode whose linear range and equivalent L
photon projectors are given in Eq. (B1). The photodiode’s voltage response is given by the conversion factor α expressed in
Eq. (B8) in general and Eq. (B11) in our case. This factor incorporates the photodiode’s bandwidth BW , its responsitivity
η (in AW−1) and the transimpedence gain G. Noise characterised by a Gaussian random variable λ is then added onto the
voltage, leading to the voltage POVM in Eq. (B12). Finally, the voltage is discretised by an ADC with resolution δV and at a
sampling rate FS , yielding the POVM associated with the measurement of the j
th votlage bin expressed in Eq. (B20). Light has
been effectively conversed from photons to a digital electrical signal which one can subsequently read on a PC or oscilloscope.
Appendix C: Proof of the Main Theorem
In this Appendix, we provide the full security proof for the more realistic QRG protocol carried out in the experiment.
As per the idealised protocol, the proof proceeds in two steps. First, we calculate the worst-case min-entropy for a
certain class of states, namely those with a limited support over Fock states. Secondly, we calculate the failure
probability of the protocol which is the maximum probability that a state not in that class could have passed the
certification test. We rewrite theorem 1 given in the main text and proceed with our proof.
Theorem 3. An optical setup consisting of
• Two trusted vacuum modes
• Two beam splitters of reflectivity r0 = 12 and r1
• Two noisy photodetectors used to make a difference measurement as described in Eq. (B22)
• A third noisy photodetector used to make a certification measurement as described in Eq. (B25) which passes
the test P if i falls in a chosen range [i−, i+]
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can be used as a certified (m,κ,ǫfail,m,ǫc)-randomness generation protocol as per Definition 1 without making any
assumptions about the photonic source with
κ ≥ −m log2
(∑
x∈X
2−n
−
R
(
n−R
⌊n
−
R+x
2 ⌋
))
, (C1)
where
X ∈ N ∩
[
−
⌊
δV
2αD
⌋
,
⌊
δV
2αD
⌋]
, (C2)
with δV = Vmax−Vmin
2∆ADC
,
ǫfail,m ≤ mǫfail , (C3)
where
ǫfail = max{ǫ−, ǫ+}+ ǫλC , (C4)
with
ǫ− = exp

−2
(
v−i−
−λ˜
αC
− r1
(
v−i−
−λ˜
αC
+ n−R − 1
))2
v−i−
−λ˜
αC
+ n−R − 1

 ,
ǫ+ = exp

−2
(
n+R − (1− r1)
(
v+i+
−λ˜
αC
+ n+R + 1
))2
v+i+
−λ˜
αC
+ n+R + 1

 ,
ǫλC = erf
(
λ˜√
2σC
)
, (C5)
provided n+R is set to the saturating photon number of the difference measurement.
Moreover,
ǫc = 1− tr


i+∑
i=i−
|α〉 〈α| Vˆ σC ,∆ADCC (i)

 , (C6)
using a coherent state |α〉 as an input.
Proof. Consider the task of guessing the difference measurement from the perspective of Eve who knows λD on a
shot-by-shot basis, which is given by Eq. (B23). First, this measurement satisfies the conditions of Lemma 1 and
so Eve’s optimal state is a number state. Her strategy will be to add λD to the most likely value of the noiseless
difference measurement which, as shown in Appendix A, is 0 or 1 whether Eve inputs an odd or even number of
photons. Therefore, Eve’s best guess will be the voltage bin IDj with j =
[
λD
δV
]
or j =
[
(1+λD)
δV
]
, where [.] is the
nearest integer rounding function. The guessing probability is given by the sum of all the probabilities associated
with the outcomes Xˆ(xk) for which Eve’s guess would remain true. This can be expressed as the following set
X = {x ∈ [−(L− 1), L− 1] : αDx+ λD ∈ IDj } . (C7)
For states restricted to the range [n−R, n
+
R], the guessing probability corresponds to
pguess = max
n∈[n−
R
,n+
R
]
〈n|
∑
x∈X
Xˆ(x) |n〉 , (C8)
where again the sum only includes even (odd) values of x when n is even (odd).
From the expressions above, the interplay between the voltage conversion factor αD and the voltage resolution δV
becomes clear. The number of difference measurement elements that will be mapped to a given voltage bin is given
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by
⌈
δV
αD
⌉
, such that as αD becomes smaller, this number grows and Eve’s guessing probability will increase. Since
we will only consider number states within the linear regime of the difference measurement (i.e. n+R = nmax), we
can safely assert that 〈n| Xˆ(x) |n〉 = 2−n( n−R
⌊n
−
R
+x
2
⌋
)
is a binomial distribution. Thus, the largest guessing probability
for a given n will occur when λD is such that the
⌈
δV
αD
⌉
bins are centered evenly around the origin, i.e. the middle
portion of the binomial distribution. Moreover, we know from Appendix A that the guessing probability will decrease
monotonically with the photon number. This yields
pguess ≤
∑
x∈X
2−n
−
R
(
n−R
⌊n
−
R+x
2 ⌋
)
, (C9)
which is exactly Eq. (C1). In the absence of a convenient bound for this quantity (i.e. an anti-concentration equivalent
of Hoeffding’s inequality for the binomial distribution), we evaluate this expression using Sterling’s approximation
which is precise enough for our purpose.
The failure probability for the protocol is given by the probability of passing the test even though a state with too
few, or too many, photons is incident onto the difference measurement in mode R. We can express the probability of
Eve successfully cheating in a single round as
ǫfail = max
ρˆE
Pr[i− ≤ i ≤ i+ ∧ nR < n−R ∨ nR > n+R]
= max
ρˆE
tr

ρˆE
i+∑
i=i−
Vˆ σC ,∆ADCF (i, n
−
R, n
+
R)


= max
nE
tr

|nE〉 〈nE |
i+∑
i=i−
Vˆ σC ,∆ADCF (i, n
−
R, n
+
R)

 , (C10)
where in the last we line we used the fact that VˆF satisfies the conditions of Lemma 1, implying that Eve’s optimal
input state will be a number state.
To begin with, let us consider this probability given a particular value for λC , the detector’s noise variable. Then,
from Eve’s perspective, this electronic noise λC is effectively removed as expressed in Eq. (B27) and we have
ǫfail = max
nE
tr

|nE〉 〈nE|
n+
C∑
nC=n
−
C
Fˆ (nC , n
−
R, n
+
R)


= max
nE
tr

|nE〉 〈nE|
∑
nC

 n
−
R∑
nR=0
B(r1, nC + nR, nC) |nC + nR〉 〈nC + nR|E
+
∞∑
nR=n
+
R+1
B(r1, nC + nR, nC) |nC + nR〉 〈nC + nR|E




= max
nE


min{n+C ,nE}∑
nC=max{n−C ,nE−(n−R−1)}
B(r1, nE , nC) +
nE∑
nR=max{n+R,nE−(n+C+1)}
B(1− r1, nE , nR)

 , (C11)
where n−C = minnC{nC : αCnC + λC ∈ IC[i−,i+]} and n+C = maxnC{nC : αCnC + λC ∈ IC[i−,i+]} with IC[i−,i+] being the
entire voltage range for which the test P is passed.
Let v±i = δV (i± 12 ) be the smallest and largest voltages corresponding to bin i. Therefore, the minimum (maximum)
voltage consistent with passing the test is v−i− (v
+
i+
). The corresponding minimum and maximum photon numbers are
n−C =
v−i− − λC
αC
,
n+C =
v+i+ − λC
αC
. (C12)
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We can use our knowledge of the detector’s noise distribution to turn these into worst case upper and lower bounds
for n+C and n
−
C respectively. Recalling that λC is Gaussian with variance σ
2
C , we can say that except with a probability
ǫλC = erf
(
λ˜√
2σC
)
, (C13)
one has |λC | < λ˜. This gives
n−C ≥
v−i− − λ˜
αC
,
n+C ≤
v+i+ − λ˜
αC
. (C14)
Next, the varying limits in the sums of Eq. (C11) can be explained as follows. For the first sum, an unconditional
lower limit is given by n−C . However, for sufficiently large inputs nE , this requirement is superseded by the constraint
that nR < n
−
R, which in turn necessitates that nC ≥ nE − (n−R − 1). The upper limit simply comes from the fact that
if nE < n
+
C , then the binomial distribution can only run up to nE . For the second sum, we have an unconditional
constraint nR > n
+
R, however again for sufficiently large nE , the requirement that nC < n
−
C implies that we must have
nR > nE − (n+C +1). Notice that depending upon the bounds for n+C and n−C , there are certain values of nE for which
the first or second sums may vanish. This turns out to be the case here (i.e. for our values only one of the sums will
be non-zero at a time).
The first sum in Eq. (C11) will vanish whenever nE > n
+
C+n
−
R−1 ≥
v+i+
−λ˜
αC
+n−R−1 and the second when nE < n+R.
In summary, as long as
n+R >
v+i+ − λ˜
αC
+ n−R − 1
⇒ λ˜ ≤ v+i+ − αC
(
n+R − n−R + 1
)
, (C15)
it implies that there are no values of nE for which both sums will be simultaneously nonzero. In our case, this
condition evaluates to
|λ˜| ≤ 1.155 . (C16)
We will always be making a much tighter probabilistic bound on λ˜ such that Eq. (C15) is satisfied at all times.
Substitution in Eq. (C13) indicates that this will be true except with probability 10−3769921, which is far below the
other failure probabilities that we certify.
Except with probability ǫλC , we can then write the single round failure probability as
ǫ′fail = max

maxnE
min{n+C ,nE}∑
nC=max{n−C ,nE−(n−R−1)}
B(r1, nE , nC),
max
nE
nE∑
nR=max{n+R,nE−(n+C+1)}
B(1− r1, nE , nR)

 . (C17)
Considering the first term, we have
max
nE
min{n+
C
,nE}∑
nC=max{n−C ,nE−(n−R−1)}
B(r1, nE, nC) ≤ max
nE
nE∑
nC=max{n−C ,nE−(n−R−1)}
B(r1, nE , nC) . (C18)
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This expression is exactly the same as Eq. (A25) for which we already know that noptE = n
−
C + n
−
R − 1. Therefore,
we can apply Hoeffding’s bound to the binomial cumulative distribution to obtain
max
nE
nE∑
nC=n
−
C
B(r1, nE , nC) ≤ exp
(
−2(n
−
C − r1(n−C + n−R − 1))2
n−C + n
−
R − 1
)
≤ exp

−2
(
v−i−
−λ˜
αC
− r1
(
v−i−
−λ˜
αC
+ n−R − 1
))2
v−i−
−λ˜
αC
+ n−R − 1

 , (C19)
provided there exists a n−R such that n
−
R >
1−r1
r1
v−i−
−λ˜
αC
.
The second term in the maximisation is again just the cumulative tail of a binomial distribution and via the same
argument as in Eq. (A25), we know that Eve should choose noptE = n
+
R + n
+
C + 1 to maximise this term, giving
nE∑
nR=n
+
R
B(1− r1, nE , nR) ≤ exp
(
−2(n
+
R − (1− r1)(n+C + n+R + 1))2
n+C + n
+
R + 1
)
≤ exp

−2
(
n+R − (1 − r1)
(
v+i+
−λ˜
αC
+ n+R + 1
))2
v+i+
−λ˜
αC
+ n+R + 1

 , (C20)
provided there exists n+R >
1−r1
r1
v+i+
−λ˜
αC
.
Thus, the total failure probability for one round of the protocol is given by
ǫfail = ǫ
′
fail + ǫλC
= max


exp

−2
(
v−i−
−λ˜
αC
− r1
(
v−i−
−λ˜
αC
+ n−R − 1
))2
v−i−
−λ˜
αC
+ n−R − 1

 ,
exp

−2
(
n+R − (1− r1)
(
v+i+
−λ˜
αC
+ n+R + 1
))2
v+i+
−λ˜
αC
+ n+R + 1




+ erf
(
λ˜√
2σC
)
. (C21)
which is exactly Eq. (C5), thereby completing the proof. Lastly, the argument for completeness is the same as that
in Appendix A.
Appendix D: Mathematical details
Here, we are interested in the photon number distribution of ρˆpassR , the state input to the QRG that passes the test P
given that we observe nC > n
−
C . We can precisely quantify the extent to which ρˆ
pass
R is operationally indistinguishable
from a state σˆn−
R
with support over [n−R,∞[ by calculating the trace distance to the closest such state. Since the trace
distance determines the maximum probability that Eve can distinguish the two situations, as mentioned above, we
can interpret this quantity as the upper bound on the probability that the protocol fails and the min-entropy is not
lower bounded by Eq. (C1). Thus, recalling that and without loss of generality, we can take both states to be diagonal
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in the Fock basis such that the trace distance is effectively calculated between classical probability distributions. We
obtain the following expression
ǫfail ≤ max
ρˆE
1
2
|ρˆpassR − σˆn−R |
= max
ρˆE
n−R−1∑
nR=0
〈nR| ρˆpassR |nR〉
= max
ρˆE
∞∑
nC=n
−
C
n−
R
−1∑
nR=0
tr{ρˆEMˆ(nC , nR)}
= max
ρˆE
tr

ρˆE
∞∑
nC=n
−
C
Fˆ (nC , n
−
R)

 , (D1)
where the maximisation is taken over Eve’s input to the certification measurement. This can also be simply understood
as the joint probability for detecting n−C or more photons in mode C and less than n
−
R in mode R and it is the same
as Eq. (A24), as claimed in Appendix A.
Appendix E: Source-device independent quantum random number expansion
The certified QRG either aborts or, except with some failure probability ǫfail,m, produces an output X with a
min-entropy Hmin(X |E) ≥ κ > 0 with respect to any third party, even one with complete control over the photonic
source and access to all other environmental modes. However, the final goal of a randomness expansion protocol is
to utilise an initial random seed in order to generate a much longer bit string that is “ǫ-close” (in some well chosen
metric) to perfectly uniformly distributed and unpredictable with respect to any third party. This can be achieved
via randomness extraction (also sometimes called privacy amplification), which is a judiciously chosen post-processing
of the measurements. We would also like to be confident that a realistic implementation of the protocol will succeed
with high probability. Without loss of generality, the output state S of this post-processing can be written as a
classical-quantum state
ρˆSE =
∑
s
PS(s) |s〉 〈s| ⊗ ρˆsE , (E1)
for which we have the following definition.
Definition 2. A protocol that outputs a state of the form in Eq. (E1) is
• ǫs-secure (or sound) if
ppass
1
2
||ρˆSE − τˆS ⊗ σˆE ||1 ≤ ǫs , (E2)
where ppass is the probability that the certification test is passed, || · ||1 is the trace norm and τˆS is the uniform
(i.e. maximally mixed) state over S. This means that there is no device or procedure that can distinguish between
the actual protocol and an ideal protocol with probability higher than ǫs.
• ǫc-complete (or robust) if there exists an honest implementation such that 1− ppass ≤ ǫc.
The properties of the trace norm ensure that randomness satisfying Definition 2 is composable, which is critical for
cryptographic applications [41].
Particular care must be taken against quantum adversaries to choose an extractor that has provable security when
considering potentially quantum side information. In general, quantum-secure randomness extraction can be seen as
a function Ext : {0, 1}m × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}l that involves processing the m-bit measurement outcomes along with a
random d-bit seed to produce an l-bit output that is ǫ-close to being perfectly random.
A very attractive choice is two-universal hashing [47] (or leftover hashing) which is secure against quantum ad-
versaries [33, 42] and can be implemented efficiently as it achieves an excellent trade-off between ǫ and l. It should
be noted that this extractor still requires a perfectly random seed of length d and thus any protocol that makes use
of leftover hashing can technically only be regarded as a randomness expansion protocol [48, 49]. Whilst the length
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of the seed must be chosen proportional to m, it only has to be generated once and can be safely reused to hash
arbitrarily many blocks, meaning that the initial random seed can be used to generate an unbounded amount of
randomness. This also means that the seed can be hard-coded into the hashing device (for a further discussion and an
explicit implementation, see [35]). Other quantum-secure methods, such as the Trevisan extractor, are more efficient
in the length of the required seed. However, this is a more computationally expensive process and cannot currently be
performed at speeds at which our protocol can generate raw randomness. Thus, to achieve bit-generation rates of the
same speed as the randomness generation rates reported here, it seems necessary to perform randomness extraction
via leftover hashing.
We now have the tools to write down the following result for certified randomness expansion. Although this is
essentially a repeat of standard techniques (see e.g. [35, 42]) adapted to our specific setup, we state it as a standalone
theorem for completeness.
Theorem 4. A certified SDI (m,κ,ǫfail,m,ǫc)-randomness generation protocol as defined in Definition 1 can be processed
with a randomness generation seed of length m via leftover hashing to produce a certified SDI random string of length
l = κ+ 2− log2
1
ǫ2hash
, (E3)
that is ǫc-complete and ǫhash + ǫfail,m secure.
Proof. Completeness: This follows immediately from the completeness of the certified randomness generation pro-
tocol.
Security: Let X be the variable describing the measurement outcomes. Recall that the output of the randomness
generation protocol after the measurement including the potential side information can be written as a classical-
quantum state
ρˆXE =
∑
x∈X
PX(x) |x〉 〈x| ⊗ ρˆxE , (E4)
where X is the alphabet of possible measurement outcomes and ρˆxE is the state of the eavesdropper given the outcome
x. A randomly chosen leftover hashing function is then applied to distill a final random string denoted by the variable
S. The joint state is now
ρˆSE =
∑
s
PS(s) |s〉 〈s| ⊗ ρˆsE . (E5)
We then apply the Leftover Hash Lemma with quantum side information [42] and its extension to infinite dimensional
Hilbert spaces [40, 50] which is necessary for our purposes.
Lemma 2. Let ρˆXE be a state of the form in Eq. (E4) where X is defined over a discrete-valued and finite alphabet
and E is a finite or infinite dimensional system. If one applies a hashing function drawn at random from a family of
two-universal hash functions that maps X to S and generates a string of length l , then
1
2
||ρˆSE − τˆS ⊗ σˆE ||1 ≤
√
2l−Hmin(X|E)−2 , (E6)
where Hmin(X |E) is the conditional smooth min-entropy (with smoothing parameter ǫ = 0) of the raw measurement
data given Eve’s quantum system.
Comparing the security definitions in Eq. (E2) and Eq. (E6), we note that with an appropriate choice of l, we
can ensure the security condition is met. In particular, we see that the smooth min-entropy is a lower bound on the
extractable key length. To get a more exact expression, first notice that if we choose
l = Hmin(X |E) + 2− 2 log2
(
ppass
ǫhash
)
, (E7)
for some ǫhash > 0, then the right hand side of Eq. (E6) becomes ǫhash/ppass. Then, provided we have definitively
bounded the smooth min-entropy, we will satisfy Eq. (E2) for any ǫhash > 0. Finally since log2(ppass) < 0, we have
l = Hmin(X |E) + 2− log2
(
1
ǫ2hash
)
. (E8)
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Now, suppose that we are only able to bound the smooth min-entropy Hmin(X |E) ≥ κ with a certain probability
1 − ǫfail,m as is the case here. Then, the convexity and boundedness of the trace distance implies that this string of
length l will be ǫs-secure for any security parameter
ǫs ≥ ǫhash + ǫfail,m , (E9)
if the length is chosen as per Eq. (E3).
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